By William H. Brenner
An imaginitive and fascinating exposition of subject matters from Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations, this ebook is helping readers locate their means round the "forest of comments" that make up this vintage. Chapters on language, brain, colour, quantity, God, worth, and philosophy increase an incredible subject: that there are many forms of language use--a type philosophy must examine yet has a tendency to miss.
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My sentence is functioning simply as a conventional replacement of a natural expression of pain such as crying. "72 B: Do you want to say that the word pain really means crying? A: I want to say that the verbal expression of pain replaces crying, not that it describes it. If I were describing a sensation when I said, "I'm in pain," then I would be "identifying my sensation by criteria" (sec. 290); but to do that would be "trying to use language to get between pain and its expression" (sec. 245)which would imply the wrong picture, namely: 71.
If asked to define "chair," we might say that it is a certain article of furniture for sitting on. But suppose there was something that looked like a chair, only to disappear just as people lower themselves onto it. We wouldn't know whether to call it a chair or not; the rules governing the use of the word ''chair" do not provide for every contingency. If all chairs were like this imaginary one, "chair" would no longer serve the function in language it presently has. That is, if the world became very different, there would be no point in making a distinction between what we call "chairs" and other kinds of things.
Digging for what is hidden" leads, in philosophy, to what Wittgenstein calls metaphysics. "What we do is to bring words back from their metaphysical to their everyday use" (sec. 116 b). PI, sec. 108, concluded. Cf. sec. 81. 38. See BB, p. 74 and Brenner, Logic, pp. 127131. 39. " See David G. Stern's Wittgenstein on Mind and Language, p. 174. ) Page 31 35 of 203 10/13/2010 11:09 PM ﬁle:///home/gyuri/downloads/elozoek/zips/brenner/... And [pace Locke41], sometimes we know which color the other sees, if he looks at this object, and sometimes we don't.