By Michael B. Oren
This e-book represents the 1st scholarly exam of the origins of the 1956 Sinai crusade among Egypt and Israel. making use of a variety of basic assets, the learn analyses the explanations for the breakdown of the Armistice contract among Egypt and Israel and the failure of efforts to mediate a peace accord.
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Extra info for The Origins of the Second Arab-Israel War: Egypt, Israel and the Great Powers, 1952-56
Further bolstering their argument was the fact 17 ORIGINS OF THE SECOND ARAB-ISRAEL WAR that, though the EIMAC had rejected the vigilante story and condemned Israel for the attack, not a single Israeli casualty had been sustained in the raid. The retaliation policy, it was proved, need not be a costly one. 20 The al-Burayj raid ended the period of relative stability on the ADL. Thereafter, the focus of tension shifted from Gaza to the DZ. Israeli strategic planners attached great importance to dominating the DZ, as a means not only of establishing their territorial claim over it, but of preventing the Egyptians from using al-Aujah as a springboard for invading the Negev, as they had done in 1948.
Tension reached a climax in January 1952, with the outbreak of anti-British riots in Cairo. These events sapped Egypt's military strength in Gaza and diminished its ability to control infiltration. Political upheaval further contributed to the escalation - three Egyptian governments fell in the spring of 1952 - as the beleaguered regime sought to rebut its detractors by demonstrating its steadfastness on Palestine. The marked increase in infiltration, accompanied by the intensification of hostile propaganda, deeply provoked the Israelis.
Egypt disclaimed sovereignty over Gaza - a policy largely directed against Jordan's annexation of the West Bank - and made efforts, such as its support of a local All-Palestine government, to distinguish it from Egyptian territory. In practice, however, Egypt exercised full sovereign rights in Gaza; the All-Palestine government had only symbolic powers. In principle, Israel denied Egypt's right to occupy Gaza but, in signing the EIAA, implicitly recognized it, and held Egypt responsible for maintaining the Armistice along the Strip.