By Ami Gluska

This new publication appears to be like at the dating among the Israeli defense force, the govt, and the origins of the 1967 battle.

Ami Gluska discusses the impression of the Israel security Forces (IDF) on Israel’s safeguard coverage among 1963-1967 opposed to the backdrop of the advancements within the center East. In addition, he describes intimately the decision-making procedure resulting in the Arab-Israeli Six Day conflict in June 1967 in the course of the prism of the kin among the army and political echelons. He exhibits how the Six Day warfare used to be a watershed occasion within the Middle-Eastern clash and had a profound impact at the improvement of the Palestinian challenge and the nature of the country of Israel over the past four a long time.

This e-book might be of serious curiosity to scholars of heart jap politics, strategic reports, Israeli politics and army heritage in general.

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Extra resources for The Israeli Military and the Origins of the 1967 War: Government, Armed Forces and Defence Policy 1963-67

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Relations with Europe would enable Israel to develop its independent deterrent nuclear capability. 22 Eshkol: ‘I doubt whether a rift with the United States would strengthen us’ A week later, in the presence of the generals, Eshkol took issue with Peres on the weapons supply issue, and voiced his skepticism as to the advantage of security links with Europe. The importance of the large Jewish community in the United States and of US aid dictated consideration for the views of the United States. Eshkol emphasized that he had no intention of conceding to Kennedy on vital issues (such as Israel’s nuclear programme), but, he added, ‘I simply want you to know: there are limits .

Haim Barlev, who regarded himself as a worthy candidate for the post of deputy Chief of Staff, was offered Northern Command but turned it down. Eshkol consulted Ben-Gurion, who considered Rabin to be ‘an honest and intelligent fellow’ who could be relied on, but ‘slightly too cautious’, so that it was preferable to appoint Weizman as his deputy. ’24 Eshkol, however, refrained from imposing his views on Rabin and, in the end, Weizman’s insistence cleared the way for Barlev, who was appointed Chief of Operations, though without the title of deputy Chief of Staff.

This did not necessarily have implications for the future, but under certain conditions a pre-emptive strike might occur on the Jordanian front to conquer territory ‘for temporary occupation’. Israeli military intervention on the West Bank would not necessarily be aimed, therefore, so he argued, at improving the border lines, but rather would be exploited as a lever for political gain. 26 In practice this did not always happen. Rabin felt free to represent the IDF’s viewpoint when he saw fit, even when his views were not in accord with the mood of the General Staff.

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