By Alan Berger
This choice of essays on Saul Kripke and his philosophy is the 1st and in basic terms selection of essays to ascertain either released and unpublished writings by way of Kripke. Its essays, written by way of exceptional philosophers within the box, current a broader photo of Kripke's lifestyles and paintings than has formerly been to be had to students of his inspiration. New subject matters lined in those essays contain vacuous names and names in fiction, Kripke on logicism and de re perspective towards numbers, Kripke at the incoherency of adopting a good judgment, Kripke on colour phrases and his feedback of the first as opposed to secondary caliber contrast, and Kripke's critique of functionalism. those essays not just current Kripke's easy arguments but additionally interact with the arguments and controversies engendered by way of his paintings, delivering the main finished research of his philosophy and writings on hand. This assortment becomes a vintage in modern analytic philosophy.
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13 So far we have considered the possibility of a description, or more likely a cluster of descriptions, “giving the meaning” of a name. But there is another way in which a description could be associated with a name. A description may “fix the reference” of a name. Perhaps descriptions do not give the meaning of names but they do tell us what the reference of a name is, in a particular way. 14 Kripke gives an explanation of what is peculiar about the standard meter bar. We are asked to suppose that the phrase ‘one meter’ acquires its meaning in a certain hypothetical way.
Nathan Salmon’s book Reference and Essence (1981) tries to disentangle the semantic and metaphysical assumptions at play in these doctrines. Even the simple extension of the necessity of identity from cases like ‘Hesperus = Phosphorus’ to ‘water = H2O’, argues Salmon, requires the introduction of substantive metaphysical assumptions that enter into the analogue for kind terms of the “baptism” of individuals. It is not clear, however, to what extent people were taken in by these confusions, at least regarding singular terms.
Lewis treats most theoretical terms as nonrigid, since they are defined by the sort of construction now referred to as the so-called Ramsey-Lewis method as “the” property that plays such and such a role in a given theory. While Kripke’s discussion is of natural kind terms rather than theoretical terms, Kripke’s thesis about the terms he considers nonetheless can be seen as opposed to a Lewis-style account of those same terms.