By Dag Prawitz
This quantity examines the suggestion of an analytic evidence as a traditional deduction, suggesting that the proof's worth should be understood as its general shape - an idea with major implications to proof-theoretic semantics.
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Extra info for Natural Deduction: A Proof-Theoretical Study
26. Stewart Goetz, “Stumping for Widerker,” Faith and Philosophy 16 (1999), pp. 83–9. In this article, he develops this and other criticisms in further detail. 27. Stump replies to Goetz’s objection in “Dust, Determinism and Frankfurt: A Reply to Goetz,” in Faith and Philosophy 16 (1999), pp. 413–22, but in my view she does not lay to rest the worry I just described. 12 In Haji’s example, the sort of libertarian agency attributed to the agent consists in its being undetermined which of various considerations will enter the mind of the agent in deliberation.
Alfred Mele and David Robb, “Rescuing Frankfurt-Style Cases,” The Philosophical Review 107 (1998), pp. ” 23. Stump, “Libertarian Freedom and the Principle of Alternative Possibilities,” pp. 77–8. 24. , p. 79. 11 the agent which is not the outcome of a causal chain that originates in a cause outside the agent. 25 But as Stewart Goetz points out, to assess this case, one needs to know more about the psychological features of the act performed by the agent to cause the neural process. If this originating act is causally determined, then Stump’s agent would appear not to be free in the libertarian sense.
38 Imagine a universe correctly described by Epicurean physics: At the most fundamental level all that exists is atoms and the frictionless void, and there is a determinate downward direction in which all atoms naturally fall – except if they undergo uncaused swerves. Situation C. A spherical atom is falling downward through space, with a certain velocity and acceleration. Its actual causal history is indeterministic because at any time the atom can be subject to an uncaused swerve. Suppose that the atom can swerve in any direction other than upwards.