By Richard Dien Winfield
From thought to Objectivity uncovers the character and authority of conceptual choice by means of seriously pondering via missed arguments in Hegel’s technology of common sense pivotal for knowing cause and its position in philosophy. Winfield clarifies the logical difficulties of presuppositionlessness and determinacy that arrange the best way for conceiving the idea that, examines how universality, particularity, and individuality are made up our minds, investigates how judgment and syllogism are exhaustively differentiated, and, on that foundation, explores how objectivity may be categorised with out casting proposal in irrevocable competition to truth. Winfield's booklet might be of curiosity to readers of Hegel in addition to someone brooding about how concept may be target.
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Additional resources for From Concept to Objectivity: Thinking Through Hegel’s Subjective Logic
Hence, no matter what terms might be employed to account for the category of something, each and every one will already be determined by the practices underlying the formation of frames of reference. In each case, all inquiry is irreducibly situated within some encompassing conceptual scheme, which plays the same foundational role whether it be rooted in the pure categories of the understanding, ideal or ordinary language, or, most concretely, in the historical practices of a given culture. Although the appeal of these arguments cannot be denied, they all rest upon 4 Immanuel Kant, The Metaphysical Elements o f Justice, John Ladd, trans.
This will be true just as much of knowledge of determinate concepts as of knowledge of determinate things. In each case, substance seems to enter in as an irreducible factor of knowledge. In regard to reality, the arguments for the irreducibility of substance are fully analogous. For anything to have a determinate existence, must there not be some underlying given substrate, bearing certain attributes rather than others? Although attributes may already have determinate meaning by being subjects of a predication defining their specific quality, they cannot exist by themselves without contradicting their character as commonly attributable qualities, as “third man” arguments can testify.
8 Hence, if the method of logic is the ordering of the content of logic, then the logical method will be at one with what it presents, in expression of the unity of form and content in logic. Because of this underlying unity, the methodological form of the thinking of thinking is only established in the determination of what thinking is by and within logical science. Consequently, the method of logic will not be conceivable apart from the content it orders. If anything like a doctrine of logical method were to be sought, it could only be obtained from the completed development of logic’s subject matter.